Streit Talk

by Tanner Huggins

The prospect of Palestinian statehood has caused a furor of diplomatic activity recently as the UN Security Council’s voting date on the issue approaches. Since Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said on Monday that he would not be deterred from seeking UN recognition of Palestine as a state, arguments for and against the possibility have been bandied about from all sides. Two disparate conclusions have arisen: one, argued for by proponents, says that the peace process can move forward only by changing the nature of the negotiations to put Palestine on equal footing with Israel. The other, argued by opponents of the bid in Israel and the United States, claims that negotiations can only be effective if they are done bilaterally, through direct negotiations between Jerusalem and Ramallah. The situation may well be lose-lose, no matter how it is resolved: as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted, “No matter what does or doesn’t happen this week, it will not produce the kind of result that everyone is hoping for.” From a purely pragmatic perspective, the search for recognition alone may be what is most damaging to the peace process.

The recent controversy about the bid has its origins in part in November of 2010, when President Obama “alluded to the prospect of a Palestinian state joining [the UN].” Though many interpreted the remarks as hopeful support of the proposal, the US has been doing all in its power to block any bid for full UN membership. The impasse is due in large part to the contention that the bid was not the product of any negotiations with Israel, but rather, in the words of Palestinian Ambassador to Lebanon Abdullah Abdullah, an attempt by Palestine to “change the rules of the game” instead of finding solutions to its problems.

However, it is not ultimately clear, as Georgetown Adjunct Professor of international human rights law in the Middle East Nourah Erakat notes, “what the objective of the statehood bid” by the Palestinians actually is. Part of the argument is that, by approaching the table as state with equal status within the community of nations, Palestinian bargaining power will be increased. The recognition of statehood, though still largely symbolic, would call attention to the Israeli settlement process and place the PA, at least internationally, on a more equal footing with Israel. Without a change in strategy, though, international recognition will change little ‘on the ground,’ and with staunch resistance from the United States and Israel it will certainly not introduce any momentum into the peace process.

Given that the possibility of Abbas backing down on the proposal seems slim, what would it mean if the bid were passed? One question that arises from the possibility of Palestinian statehood is the issue of legitimacy, as posited by Guy Goodwin-Gill, Professor of public international law at Oxford University. His argument is that, given the “imposed, top-down” nature of the Palestinian Authority, a transition of that organization into the “State of Palestine” would not account for the will of the Palestinian people as a whole. Where, he asks, is the legitimacy of the state, given the lack of meaningful elections? In light of the ‘Arab Spring,’ this question is increasingly relevant – even pro-Palestinian groups note that there is no such thing as a “collective Palestinian entity,” and popular support for the UN statehood proposal isn’t necessarily forthcoming. Would these same Palestinians, gifted with statehood, stand in solidarity with a government that doesn’t necessarily represent their interests?

Of course, that question may well be academic, as President Obama has thus far done nothing to indicate that the US will reconsider its veto; in fact, he has done quite the opposite. Even though the bid has support from China, Russia, Brazil, and more, the lack of US and Israeli support — and the apparently successful attempts by the US to woo the UK around to its position — means that, at least in regards to the Security Council, the bid is already dead in the water. The European Union has remained noncommittal throughout the process, but seems unlikely to favor a General Assembly bid. The EU’s Foreign Affairs representative Catherine Ashton has said that since “there is no resolution on the table yet…there is no [EU] position.” UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, speaking on behalf of his government  and “all the other 26 countries of the European Union,” has said that the “only real way forward” is for the two states to return to the negotiating table.

Given a zero-percent chance of success in the Security Council, then, does it make sense for Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to go forward with the plan? Abbas and the PA appear to have much more to lose than to gain. Though recognition through the General Assembly may well be a symbolic victory for the PA, the price of that victory — an incensed Israel, a United States forced to exert its veto despite being loath to the possibility, and no meaningful change in resolving long-term issues like resources, settlement, and the state of East Jerusalem — would make any recognition Pyrrhic at best.

Tanner Huggins is an Intern at the Streit Council; Photo Credit:  real.tingley (http://www.flickr.com/photos/realtingley/4930429255/).

by Andrew Fenzel

Libyan rebels, seen here, after overrunning Muammar Qadhafi's compound

Now that Muammar Qadhafi is no longer in power, the next step is to ensure that Libya becomes a stable nation. Until recently, however, there was no mention of a post-conflict strategy – a surprising development given the lessons of Iraq.  As the conflict speeds toward a conclusion, Western leaders, along with the Libyan rebels’ National Transitional Council (NTC), are scrambling to formulate a viable strategy. To reduce the chances that Libya will suffer the same fate as Iraq: 1) NATO should ensure Libya’s security; 2) the US and the EU should assist Libya in its transition to liberal democracy; and 3) a UN-led regional multilateral coalition should be created to help rebuild Libya and guarantee peace and stability.

First, NATO should play an integral role in maintaining Libya’s security. Notwithstanding the victory by the rebels, there are factions loyal to Qadhafi still fighting. Consequently, NATO should not only continue to enforce the no-fly zone and the arms embargo, it should also deploy a small number of ground forces. Since Europe has the most at stake in stabilizing Libya, the forces should come overwhelmingly from France and Italy. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently said: “We do not see a lead role for NATO in Libya once this crisis is over.” But NATO cannot simply declare victory and walk away; it must finish the job by placing a UN-sanctioned peacekeeping force on the ground.

Second, the US and the EU should provide limited assistance to Libya as it reestablishes governance. Neither side of the Atlantic can afford to get involved in another protracted post-conflict reconstruction project, but they should provide technical assistance so that the NTC can restore law and order, create a constitution, and call for elections. The NTC is off to a good start: it has called on its supporters to include pro-Qadhafi factions in a new government and has rejected  retribution killings. Once again, France, Italy, and other key European states need to step up their assistance.

Third, Western nations should build a coalition of regional organizations under the purview of the UN. As Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, has argued, international politics will become increasingly multilateral. Libya would be good example of how regional organizations, the members of which generally have a strong interest in maintaining stability in their neighborhood, can contribute to the reconstruction a country. The African Union and the Arab League should work closely to restore Libya’s economy and damaged infrastructure.

So far, the West has not paid enough attention to post-conflict planning. With no post-conflict strategy fully articulated, Libya faces an uncertain future. But with a UN-led regional coalition, limited US and EU support, and NATO peacekeeping forces, a stable post-Qadhafi Libya would be within reach.

Andrew Fenzel is an Intern at the Streit Council. Photo credit: Magharebia (http://www.flickr.com/photos/magharebia/6080516206/)

by Griffin W. Huschke

NATO chief Rasmussen meets with UN head Ban Ki-Moon

There’s been a lot of news out of Libya recently, with the UN approving a NATO-led no-fly zone, and the Libyan government offering a “cease-fire”  in rapid succession.  While only time will tell if the Qaddafi government will stick to its word regarding the cease fire, the recent collaboration between the UN and NATO–two organizations which sometimes seemed to have mutually exclusive mandates–is worthy of some discussion.

There’s been astonishingly little work done at the think tank level on NATO-UN cooperation (except for this trenchant piece), which is surprising considering the magnitude of the issue and the sheer number of people doing research on international organizations.   All the trend-lines are encouraging for the prospects of further cooperation as well: NATO leaders continue to interface with UN officials on a regular basis, sharing information on both of the organizations’ interests and actions. Coordination between NATO and the UN during the Libyan crisis and other operations in Africa, including the joint African Union-UN mission to Sudan, shows that the UN and NATO can work well on the ground, too.

Part of the reason the UN needs NATO so much is because of the West’s awesome logistical capabilities.  Called “legs” by the folks in uniform, NATO member states (especially the U.S.) have an unparalleled ability to deploy troops and supplies all over the world, using a combination of cargo ships, landing craft, and big, big helicopters.  Even during the Cold War, NATO could afford to chill “over the horizon” from possible conflict areas, because they could deploy well trained fighting men and women to anywhere in the world in a flash.  And when the UN is trying to stop genocide in areas that are hard to get to, à la Sudan, NATO is really the only organization that can get people and things where they need to be to stop horrific bloodshed.

But NATO needs the UN just as much.  NATO has always had a bit of an image problem with Non-Aligned countries and some members of the former Warsaw Pact, who were suspicious of the organization they saw as a tool of capitalist/imperialist countries messing in places they shouldn’t be.  But when NATO acts on a UN Security Council resolution, it gives the Alliance an air of legitimacy and respect from nations that may otherwise be wary of NATO troops far outside of Europe.  It also shores up support for domestic constituencies in the Alliance—publics in many European countries aren’t that psyched about deploying members of their military of faraway places, and the Security Council can help citizens in NATO countries realize that Alliance action is sometimes very necessary.

There are likely to be some hiccups in the relationship ahead, however.  Going forward, the UN and NATO are going to have to figure how to make their relationship more concrete without upsetting Russia, which still sees the Alliance as a bit of a home-wrecker.  But a clear institutional bond between the two organizations will give specific responsibility to both groups and enhance their short- and long-term success.   Hopefully, with further cooperation, these roles will become apparent, and strengthen the institutional links and provide better security and international governance for all.

Griffin W. Huschke is the Mayme and Herb Frank Fund Research Fellow at the Streit Council. Photo Credit: 350.org (http://www.flickr.com/photos/350org/3024810737/sizes/o/in/photostream/)

by Griffin W. Huschke

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

On Friday, the NATO Ambassadors met in an emergency session of the North Atlantic Council, the primary decision making body of NATO, in response to the zombie apocalypse-like conditions in Libya.  There have been some terrifying reports leaking out of the country since protests started 11 days ago, and NATO sort of has an obligation to mull its options on trying to make the situation better.

While most people knew NATO’s options were pretty limited—except for Fidel Castro and this guy–the North Atlantic Council did the right thing by considering a no-fly zone, making a vague threat, and punting the decision to the UN.  Despite recent outreach to other areas, NATO is still an inherently transatlantic organization, and Libya lies outside the Area of Operations for NATO forces not acting on Article 5.  The UN however, has the right mix of monitoring, civilian pressure, and international clout to enact sanctions on Kaddafi and his crew that are effective and legitimate.  Also, unlike NATO, the UN Security Council can extend jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to places so bad even China and Russia are appalled.  Like, say, the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

The effective interplay between NATO and the UN is the result of a relationship that has been growing stronger over the last two decades.  The UN began warming up to NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which would never allow the UN to sanctioned a mission with an imperialist organization like NATO .  Since then, however, the two organizations have been two intergovernmental peas in a pod: NATO expanded its AO in Afghanistan as the result of a UN mandate, and NATO intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo at the behest of the UN.  There’s also been better information sharing and closer contacts between the leaders of the two organizations, especially after September 11^th.  Finally, in 2008, the SecGens of both NATO and the UN signed the “Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation,” which made the deeper UN-NATO relationship all but Facebook Official.

Better relations between the UN and NATO is a force multiplier that allows both organizations to act more effectively.  By acknowledging each other’s comparative advantages, the two organizations can work on problems they are designed for, while trusting the other to do the same.  And although the descendents of Thomas Hobbes probably get a migraine every time it’s written, it’s true that IGOs can be positive-sum actors in international politics. Although very different intuitions, it is becoming more difficult for NATO and the UN to act without each other– far from being at the opposite side of the spectrum, they form an effective means of international cooperation. Libya is only the latest international problem where the organizations acted efficiently to best serve those who need help the most.  It probably won’t be the last.

Griffin W. Huschke is the Mayme and Herb Frank Fund Research Fellow at the Streit Council.  Photo Credit:European Parliament