Streit Talk

by Matus Muron

During the past decade, EU energy policy has focused on securing supplies, decreasing dependence on unreliable suppliers such as Russia, increasing interconnectedness among member states, and promoting efficiency standards and renewables. These efforts were largely spurred by events during the winters of 2006 and 2009, when Russia exposed the vulnerability of the EU to disruptions in natural gas supplies. EU members in Central Europe that import most or all of their gas from Russia were suddenly cut off without any other viable import option, while France and Italy saw dramatic drops in supply as well. The lack of infrastructure, as well as the inability of the existing infrastructure to reverse gas flows, left these countries extremely vulnerable. The EU recognized the importance of gas for the European energy mix in the future and enacted initiatives such as its Energy 2020 strategy, which aims to improve infrastructure, energy efficiency, smart grids, and international cooperation.

Yet the threat of supply disruption is set to diminish with shale gas discoveries across Europe. Europeans hope that they will be able to imitate the U.S. shale boom in the near future with significant discoveries in the UK, Romania, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, Norway, and elsewhere. As some of the world’s largest energy companies start exploratory drilling across Europe with commercial production expected to start around 2018, the need for supply diversification will decrease. Additionally, new infrastructure projects such as Nabucco West, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline are in their preparation stage or under construction, while gas flows into Europe continue to increase. Infrastructural development, shale gas exploration, and ongoing efforts to diversify gas imports all reduce the scope for possible energy supply disruptions.

If the EU is on its way to achieving a more stable supply of gas in the near future, its resolve and willingness to invest in Energy 2020 projects may weaken. But while attaining a stable energy supply has been the main driver of EU energy efforts, there are other aspects of this policy that should remain prominent in the future. It should remain focused on developing an interconnected and competitive internal energy market, improving energy efficiency, and promoting the sustainable use of energy. Phillip Lowe, the European Commission’s Director-General for Energy, said during a European Gas Conference that “because energy sources of power and heat were relatively limited by single sources of supply in Europe, there had been an ongoing goal to create an ongoing, competitive, interconnected, integrated market for energy, particularly in natural gas.” Even as diversification continues, forging such an integrated and competitive energy market has never been more important than it is now given the EU’s economic outlook.

While shale gas developments may reduce the vulnerability of countries like Bulgaria, the impact of such incidents could be further mitigated by developing the EU’s internal energy grid, allowing Bulgaria to import from other EU states. The Bulgarian example also demonstrates the importance of market liberalization and establishing a competitive environment for energy suppliers. The Bulgarian energy market is one of the least liberalized in the EU. The state-owned Bulgarian Energy Holding owns most of the country’s power generation capabilities and Bulgaria’s only electricity transmission operator, allowing it to exercise excessive control over the electricity market. This lack of competition, which the Energy 2020 framework attempts to eliminate, has led to higher prices for consumers. This demonstrates that interconnectedness and competition are just as important for the EU’s energy market as diversifying supplies.

In the future, less energy may be flowing into the EU from the east, but it will have to come from somewhere. Whether it will be from UK shale discoveries, a huge gas field spanning across Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, or Ukraine’s new shale reserves being explored by Chevron, the EU needs an interconnected and competitive energy market to assure the most stable supply and the lowest prices for consumers in a region with a bleak economic outlook. Therefore, while shale discoveries are and will continue to be important, EU energy policy needs to continue to play a major role with a special focus on market integration, competitiveness, energy efficiency, and renewables. 

Matus Muron is an Intern at the Streit Council. Photo credit: European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2007/images/logo_2007_energy_policy_europe_light.jpg)

by Alexandra Coakley

The “drone wars” in American political discourse revolve around a skeptical line of inquiry: How tight of a leash are drones kept on? In his recent testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, argued that publicly available information on drones suggests that the White House has not yet acted outside of its designated powers. And while Rand Paul’s nearly 13-hour filibuster against John Brennan’s CIA confirmation served as a reminder that the will of the minority cannot be ignored, Paul’s central fear – that an armed unmanned aerial vehicle might be used against a non-combatant American citizen – was dismissed in a short memo sent from Attorney General Eric Holder: “The answer to that question is no.”

Still, anxiety over drones has not emerged in a vacuum of Orwellian paranoia. Bipartisan concern for individual privacy rights and questions about U.S. compliance with international human rights law are steadily pressuring the White House to acknowledge the responsibility that comes with leading the robotics revolution. The U.S. military currently operates over 8,000 UAVs, and while the non-militant fatality rate has decreased under the current administration, in his first term alone President Obama oversaw five times as many drone strikes in Pakistan as President Bush ordered during his entire presidency. While the U.S. currently leads the rest of the world in the production of drones, proliferation is expected to lead to the production of 35,000 drones in the next ten years. And if these developments are not enough to spur action, a full UN investigation of U.S. drone strikes, set to deliver its findings this fall, might encourage the administration to set new standards on drone use. 

U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, said that Washington “has not ruled out full cooperation” with the experts and human rights lawyers set to conduct the investigation in the months ahead, but U.S. policymakers should be working to shape – not merely tolerate – the drone debate. Scholars and analysts tend to agree that drones are set to play a pivotal role in modern militaries. Popular approval, however, is not internationally ubiquitous. A June 2012 poll administered by the Pew Research Center reported that while 62% of Americans approve of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, majorities in Britain, Germany, France and other European nations disapprove of them. Recent reports from Washington indicate that the Obama administration is poised to shift the drone program from the CIA to the Department of Defense, marking a potential shift toward increased accountability.

Even so, the U.S. would benefit from diversifying its overall counterterrorism approach. As Rosa Brooks, a fellow at New America Foundation, has written, global terrorism is only the latest challenge to contemporary understandings of the moral and legal boundaries of state sovereignty. Even if U.S. officials have justifiably interpreted the terrorist threat as the kind of extraordinary circumstance that requires forceful intervention, greater transparency may help ensure that current policies do not run afoul of best intentions. During the Cold War too, covert operations were most successful when they functioned as an accessory to – not a replacement for – diplomacy. In the same vein, the White House should strive to promote drones as a tactical necessity, but not the lone anchor of long-term U.S. counterterrorism policy.

The administration should also work to forge a common view on domestic drone use among democratic states. With the civil functions of drones rapidly expanding, calls for regulation on both sides of the Atlantic present an opportunity to strengthen privacy laws and adopt preventive measures for the eventuality of domestic drone abuses. The latter is likely to become increasingly acute as drones are developed by authoritarian regimes. U.S. officials need to capitalize on the as yet relative infancy of this industry and work closely with allies in Europe and beyond to form a critical mass on internal drone use. Indeed, if the U.S. follows the reasoning it currently invokes to justify drone strikes, its global responsibility will soon extend beyond protecting civilian populations from terrorist networks to the very weapons employed to dismantle them.

Alexandra Coakley is an Intern at the Streit Council. Photo credit: UK Ministry of Defence (http://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/8536294421/)

by Klaudiusz Brian Magierowski

Anyone who watched The Day After, the classic Cold War era movie about the aftermath of a full-scale nuclear war, was likely horrified. Certainly, then-President Ronald Reagan was. From that time on, he became an ardent advocate of nuclear disarmament. While his legacy includes two successful nuclear arms reductions treaties, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), it also includes the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) – a missile defense program which formed the basis for subsequent advances in this area.

Now, three decades later, the Obama administration is preparing to kick-start negotiations with Russia on further nuclear force reductions and the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) of U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD). While citing budgetary constraints, the administration has already shelved the final phase of the EPAA in order to facilitate negotiations on these issues and revive the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations. While this could also open the door to immediate U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran, North Korea, and/or other issues, it is a riskier proposition in the long-run as nuclear technology continues to proliferate. 

As North Korea threatens the U.S. with a preemptive nuclear strike, Iran is on the verge of attaining the ability to produce a nuclear weapon and could trigger a regional nuclear arms race. Furthermore, a nuclear-armed Pakistan is becoming another sanctuary for the Taliban, just as Afghanistan was before. It is worth reiterating that even one nuclear weapon would inflict devastating losses if detonated above a populous city or at a high altitude; the latter would unleash an electromagnetic pulse that would destroy all unprotected electronics and regress an attacked country’s development by hundreds of years. Deterrence alone may not be reliable enough when dealing with rogue states with unknown, unstable, or radical leadership, because their values and goals may be completely different from those of the West. And there is always the danger of an unauthorized missile launch or nuclear blackmail. Therefore, maximizing the effectiveness of BMD is increasingly crucial.

Unfortunately, the New START Treaty, signed in 2010, forces restrictions on U.S. BMD. The key limitation, articulated in the treaty’s preamble, implies that any Russian strategic arsenal reductions must be accompanied by missile defense reductions. Although the U.S. claims that preambular statements are not legally binding, for Russia the “linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled out […] and is legally binding.” Sensing that nuclear force reductions are a White House priority, the Kremlin, in a unilateral statement, voiced its willingness to exit the treaty if “a build-up in the [U.S.] missile defense system […] would give rise to a threat to the [Russia’s] strategic nuclear force[s].” Russia particularly opposed the fourth phase of the missile defense plan in Europe, when the most sophisticated BMD assets called for under the EPAA would be deployed, and is seeking binding legal guarantees that BMD will not be used against it.

In anticipation of a new round of nuclear arms reduction negotiations, it is worth contrasting President Obama’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the Global Zero movement with his not-so-passionate approach to missile defense. While on the campaign trail, Obama pledged funding cuts for missile defense program and later, once in office, he delivered them. This, combined with the administration’s view of the New START Treaty as a step toward reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, and the Obama’s recent “flexibility” in negotiations with Russia on BMD, suggests that the program is not a White House priority. Instead, Obama intends to address the serious problem of nuclear weapons proliferation by leading the world by example.

On the Russian side, however, Global Zero denuclearization efforts are criticized as “pure propaganda and a romantic idea.” Moreover, Russia’s shifting strategic position vis-à-vis China is increasingly fragile – its economy is based on the export of natural resources, it has a much smaller population that is quickly declining, and its conventional forces are rapidly deteriorating. Moreover, China is believed to possess the ability to drastically build-up its nuclear arsenal. In this situation, Moscow envisages the first use of a limited number of these weapons on the battlefield in a conventional conflict. As a result, Russia is not likely to be as enthusiastic about tactical nuclear weapons reductions. But it is likely to hold out the prospect of reducing its nuclear weapons, including tactical ones, as a bargaining chip in the upcoming negotiations given that these cuts “must be considered in a complex of other problems of arms control, including deployment of a ballistic missile defense system.”

Can the U.S. negotiate both a new nuclear arms reduction agreement and maximize the effectiveness of missile defense with the Kremlin’s blessing? Probably not, since Russia is hostile to the fourth phase of the EPAA and further reductions may not be in the Kremlin’s strategic interest. The Obama administration’s move to suspend the fourth phase may facilitate the negotiation of a new agreement, and could even spur cooperation with Russia on other global security issues. But given the reality of nuclear proliferation, U.S. missile defenses must continue to advance in preparation for strategic surprises that risk harming both it and its allies in Europe and beyond. Rather than flexibility, it may be time for President Obama to show greater firmness, as President Reagan did when negotiating with the Soviets.

Klaudiusz Brian Magierowski is an Intern at the Streit Council. Photo credit: Pete Souza (http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/18/bilateral-meeting-president-putin)

by Mitch Yoshida and Alessia Rossi

After years of economic uncertainty and stalled multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, U.S. and EU leaders have decided to negotiate a comprehensive trade and investment agreement – formally known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – by the end of 2014. By removing barriers between the world’s two largest and most intertwined economies, they aim to boost economic growth, spur job creation, and deepen and extend the reach of liberal international economic rules.

Policymakers, business leaders, and scholars have repeatedly called for the removal of barriers to transatlantic trade and investment during the past 20 years. In 1995, the New Transatlantic Agenda stated the intent to create a “New Transatlantic Marketplace” to “expand trade and investment opportunities and multiply jobs on both sides of the Atlantic” and “contribute to the dynamism of the global economy.” The next major step in this direction came in 2007, when the Transatlantic Economic Council was established to oversee and accelerate transatlantic economic integration. Despite progress in some sectors, liberalizing the broader transatlantic economy has proven easier said than done. Differences over agriculture, subsidies, regulations, and other issues were too difficult to overcome.

But the prospects for an agreement have improved markedly in recent years. Within the U.S. and the EU, persistently weak growth and high levels of unemployment and debt are driving senior policymakers to invest substantial political capital in concluding an agreement. After all, a freer transatlantic market would lead to more competition and larger economies of scale, spurring growth and job creation. Such an agreement would, in effect, provide a much-needed stimulus to both economies without the need for additional government spending. And interests that typically raise major objections to free trade agreements – labor and environmental groups, in particular – have relatively less to argue about since U.S. and EU labor and environmental standards are among the most stringent in the world.

While U.S. and EU tariffs are already low – around 3-4% on average – lowering them further would yield enormous benefits as they apply to a large volume of trade. Estimates vary, but according to Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, a zero-tariff agreement on goods alone could boost annual U.S. and EU GDP by 1.48% and 0.48% respectively. When it comes to lowering non-tariff or “behind the border” barriers, the potential gains are much larger. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, halving non-tariff barriers could provide a GDP boost of 3% to both sides of the Atlantic. A comprehensive agreement on both types of barriers could create 7 million new jobs. Although these estimates are on the higher side, they illustrate the benefits of concluding an agreement of the TTIP’s depth and breadth.

U.S. and European policymakers are also being driven toward an agreement by developments elsewhere. The WTO’s stalled Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is holding back global economic growth, and could in time undermine the liberal economic rules that have constituted an important pillar of the international order since the end of the Second World War. A freer transatlantic market would help push the Doha Round toward a conclusion by enabling the U.S. and the EU to deepen the liberal economic rules of the road, incentivize their broader adoption, and improve the competitiveness of their companies. It could also be leveraged to promote further reforms within and beyond the scope of the WTO, including those that strengthen market disciplines for state-owned enterprises, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.

Despite the strong incentives driving policymakers toward an agreement, hurdles remain. Agricultural interests are likely to pose a challenge despite budgetary pressures and high commodity prices; in fact, they have already adopted positions that will make for challenging negotiations. We can also expect disagreements over issues that are important to a broader range of interests, including divergent regulations and health, safety, and environmental standards. And therein could lie the biggest challenge facing U.S. and EU negotiators since they must, at least to some degree, forge consensus among national regulatory authorities if the final agreement is to have a significant impact. In this way, the TTIP requires a step beyond “negative integration” – that is, beyond the simple removal of barriers that are typical of free trade agreements – and toward the creation of common rules and standards that “positive integration” entails.  

This would be an ambitious step toward a more integrated transatlantic market – one that is necessary to revitalize the American and European economies and steer the future of the international order in a liberal direction. When it comes to market size, it has long been recognized that “bigger is better.” This still holds true today, and the stakes are too high not to act. 

Mitch Yoshida is a Mayme and Herb Frank Research Fellow at the Streit Council. Alessia Rossi is an Intern at the Streit Council. 

by Kerry Givens

Next month, the P5+1 and Iran are expected to meet again to discuss the latter’s ongoing nuclear program – a meeting that many argue could be the last before Iran crosses the Rubicon and acquires a nuclear weapon. So far, NATO has largely steered clear of the issue even though a nuclear Iran could compromise the security of its members by posing a direct threat and triggering a regional nuclear arms race. For the time being, this may be the best move; after all, deeper NATO involvement would risk opening an intra-Alliance rift with Turkey, which is more economically dependent on Iran than other member states. Yet as Iran’s nuclear program progresses, the time is quickly approaching when Turkey and NATO may be forced to clarify their positions.

Turkey’s size, geographic location, and political system have led many to argue that it acts as a “bridge” between East and West. This is arguably significant due to the cultural barriers that exist between the West and developing nations in the Middle East. Turkey’s membership in NATO bolsters its military credibility and allows it to influence its neighbors in ways that are helpful to the Alliance, as well as its regional neighbors. At the same time, it has maintained good relations with Iran since 1979, when the latter declared itself an Islamic republic. Reflecting its position as a “bridge,” the Turkish government agreed to host a NATO early warning radar station while arguing that Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and refusing to join U.S. and EU sanctions.

The controversy over Iran’s nuclear program centers in particular on Iran’s failure to declare sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), not to mention the five United Nations Security Council Resolutions directing Iran to stop its uranium enrichment process and comply with IAEA inspections. In addition, Iran’s ability to deliver a nuclear weapon is of great concern and can be divided into three main categories: short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1,000 kilometers), medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (between 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) (more than 5,500 kilometers).    Together, Iran’s short and medium-range ballistic missiles place the entire Middle East in range – Israel, Saudi Arabia, and NATO forces in Turkey would be at risk. As far as intermediate-range missiles and ICBMs go, it has not been confirmed whether or not Iran has this capability yet.

Estimates on when Iran will be able to build a nuclear weapon and mate it with one or more of these delivery systems vary, but President Obama recently asserted that it will take a year or more. And while economic sanctions and covert action have proven effective at slowing Iran’s nuclear program, it is still active and has received support from Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, and possibly China. In the absence of a resolution to this issue, which has the potential to directly threaten Europe, spark a regional nuclear arms race, and destabilize a key region for the global economy, Turkey and the rest of NATO must work to forge a common strategy on Iran. If Iran does develop nuclear weapons, this would help avoid an intra-Alliance split and facilitate the formation of a coherent response to a common threat.

Kerry Givens is an Intern at the Streit Council. Photo credit: NATO (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/photos_84534.htm)

by James Maloney

As the civil war in Syria rages on, so does debate over whether U.S. and European powers should intervene. Such discussions in the media tend to be binary, suggesting either full-scale military intervention to attempt to evict the Assad regime or complete inaction. It is clear that the U.S. and European governments do not have the stomach, let alone the budgets, for another military intervention in the Middle East. Yet commentators pay little attention to lower-level methods of intervention that could mitigate the effects of the Syrian conflict and prevent its spread. Perhaps the most significant consequence of the war is the flood of Syrian refugees spilling out of the country and into its neighbors. The more than 740,000 registered refugees, with the potential to double, constitute a serious security threat that could see this state-bound conflict swell into a regional one. Three effects of refugee crises make them so destabilizing:

Negative Effects on Host Countries

A mass influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees obviously has a serious impact on a host state’s economy and public health and housing systems. Contrary to most portrayals, refugees are not always isolated in camps. According to a report published by the International Rescue Committee, the majority of Syrian refugees reside outside camps. This makes it more difficult to serve these refugees, oversaturates cities, and places a strain on resources. Without proper support, the refugees’ presence can lead to civil strife as residents build resentment toward the refugees for their encroachment and toward the government for its failure to deal with the influx.  

Demographic Shifts

Refugees often arrive in host states with little more than the clothing on their backs. Yet the significance of their particular demographic features cannot be forgotten – especially in such a diverse and tradition-soaked region as the Middle East. An incursion of refugees can upset the delicate ethnic balance in power or social standing. Such a destabilizing shift occurred in 1960s and early 1970s when Palestinians sought refuge in Jordan from fighting in Israel. The large number of Palestinians provided a base for the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which used power accrued from the large Palestinian refugee population to launch attacks against Israel. As the PLO strengthened, King Hussein of Jordan feared the group could threaten his authority and form a rival government. After a number of clashes between Jordanian and PLO forces, on September 15, 1970 the Jordanian army entered Palestinian refugee camps and attacked Palestinian militants and civilians indiscriminately for 10 days.

This episode, known as Black September, demonstrates how a large homogenous refugee group can alter a state’s internal power balance so significantly as to challenge the government’s authority. The Jordanian government has not forgotten the trauma of this bout. Palestinians account for about half of the population in Jordan and, fearing a repeat of Black September, Jordanian border agents have turned away Palestinian refugees flowing from Syria. Because of its own violent history with the Palestinians, the Lebanese government has placed special restrictions on the visas of Palestinians coming from Syria.

Power Vacuums

Those forced to flee, whether they are refugees or internally displaced people, can also represent an opportunity for regional interests. Civil wars often create power vacuums that ambitious groups scramble to fill as soon as possible. Consider Jabhat al-Nursa, an offshoot of al-Qaeda; well-funded and armed to the teeth by regional backers, it cannot thrive without local support. Thus, in addition to its militant-terrorist activity, the group is gaining ground in Syria, where it provides internally displaced Syrians protection from the Assad government, much needed law enforcement and a stable food supply. The group is winning over hearts and minds by filling stomachs, not through ideological preaching. The longer the war continues, the longer Jabhat al-Nursa has to establish itself as a legitimate player in the region that can demand a seat at the table for Syria’s reconstruction. Successfully lobbying a group of people that is forced to flee can provide a shrewd organization with support quite quickly.   

Securing the Refugees

Refugee crises require urgent action as the cost of hesitation on the part of aid agencies, host states, and/or the international community is measured in human lives and suffering. The most effective means of refugee management is to be prepared in advance. The U.S. and Europe could save money and lives in the long-term by strengthening their commitment to refugee agencies. The U.S. and European states currently constitute 8 of the top 10 donors to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR); yet most of this funding supports efforts to quell crises already in progress. Furthermore, this funding is inadequate as demonstrated by an emergency meeting on January 30th, when the agency successfully lobbied UN donor countries for $1.5 billion to fund its efforts in and around Syria for six months.

Transatlantic powers should provide the UNHCR and other organizations greater funding earmarked specifically to boost preparedness and training efforts, so that they can rapidly and effectively deploy at the first sign of trouble. The U.S. and Europe should also use their influence to encourage other states to contribute more to the UNHCR, as refugee crises are events that affect, and are solved best by, the international community as a whole. With a larger budget, the agency could expand its advocacy efforts for refugees and help standardize asylum procedures among states in order to ensure efficient processing and that the rights of asylum seekers and host states are respected. Most importantly, a robust and well-prepared UNCHR would be better suited to manage refugees and prevent instability. It would be able to help host states manage demographic shifts through increased security, or separate groups prone to conflict. Adequate and rapid assistance to refugees also provides legitimacy and respect to the provider and discourages refugees from seeking assistance from undesirable or exploitative groups. It is important to recognize that these are not problems that can be solved by an ad hoc unit and bundles of cash. Refugee assistance requires an intelligent, well-staffed and prepared agency in order to protect lives, end suffering and minimize security risks. 

For all of this talk of “refugee management,” at its core, this practice is a moral and humanitarian exercise. To that end, ensuring that refugee agencies are properly prepared to act when a crisis breaks is of vital importance to save lives and ensure stability. 

James Maloney is an Intern at the Streit Council. Photo credit: UN Photo by Mark Garten (http://www.unmultimedia.org/s/photo/detail/537/0537297.html)